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**Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General**

Situation of human rights in the Sudan

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights*

Summary

The present report, prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 57/2, depicts the situation of human rights in the Sudan from 16 November 2024 to 15 November 2025 and includes recommendations to address it.

* Agreement was reached to publish the present document after the standard publication date owing to circumstances beyond the submitter's control.



I. Introduction and methodology

1. The present report, which covers the period from 16 November 2024 to 15 November 2025, is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 57/2, in which the Council requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with the assistance of his designated Expert on human rights in the Sudan, to submit a comprehensive report on the situation of human rights in the Sudan to the Council at its sixty-first session.

2. A draft of the report was shared with the Sudanese authorities for factual comments. However, no comments were received by the extended deadline.

3. The present report is based on information gathered by the Expert and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in the Sudan. It includes information obtained through interviews with 778 sources (380 men, 382 women, 10 boys and 6 girls), including victims, their family members, and witnesses. The interviews included those conducted during OHCHR monitoring missions to Chad, Uganda, and the Abyei Administrative Area. The present report also includes analysis of photographs, satellite imagery and video footage, of other United Nations reports and authorities' statements, and of information from other sources. The security situation linked to the expanding conflict and intensifying hostilities has had a significant impact on the protection of victims and witnesses and on access to conflict-affected areas, and has also led to communication disruptions, compelling OHCHR to rely mainly on remote monitoring.

4. OHCHR employs a "reasonable grounds to believe" standard in its assessment of incidents investigated, and considers the credibility and reliability of the sources, taking into account their nature and objectivity. It draws conclusions only when that standard has been met.

5. The High Commissioner continued his engagement on the Sudan during the reporting period through meetings and public advocacy.¹ On 4 August 2025, he briefed the Security Council on the situation in the Sudan during closed consultations. On 14 November 2025, he addressed the situation in El Fasher during the thirty-eighth special session of the Human Rights Council.²

6. The Expert visited Nairobi on 12 and 13 December 2024, to build on his previous engagement with various stakeholders working on the Sudan. He visited Port Sudan from 27 to 31 July 2025, and met with Sudanese authorities, United Nations officials, civil society representatives, humanitarian partners and internally displaced persons. The Expert continued to hold regular virtual meetings with Sudanese civil society representatives. He also engaged regularly with the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan.

7. OHCHR continued to engage, *inter alia*, with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and with humanitarian actors to integrate human rights and protection of civilian considerations in political and humanitarian efforts. OHCHR also engaged in the consultative process that brought together government counterparts, civil society and the United Nations, facilitating substantive discussions across the pillars of the Framework of Cooperation on the Prevention of and Response to Sexual Violence in Conflict.

¹ See the OHCHR statements on the Sudan, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/latest?field_geolocation_target_id%5B1119%5D=1119&field_content_category_target_id%5B187%5D=187&field_content_category_target_id%5B190%5D=190&field_content_category_target_id%5B189%5D=189.

² See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/11/high-commissioner-special-session-sudan-international-community-has>.

II. Political and security developments

8. The conflict in the Sudan, now almost ending its third year, has evolved into a deeply fragmented and ethnically charged war. The mobilization of civilians along tribal and ethnic lines, coupled with the flow of weapons into the country, has significantly escalated hostilities, deepened societal divisions and undermined prospects for peace.

9. During the reporting period, intense fighting persisted, amid the expansion of the conflict to new areas, with OHCHR documenting the killing of at least 5,359 civilians. The highest numbers of casualties were recorded in the Darfur region (2,437 casualties, including 2,208 in North Darfur) and the Kordofan region (1,253 casualties).

10. On 11 January 2025 the Sudanese Armed Forces recaptured the city of Wad Madani in Al-Gazira State, and on 20 May 2025 they recaptured Khartoum State.

11. The Kordofan region remained volatile and a focus of hostilities, particularly since May 2025, as the parties continued to vie for control of strategic locations in the region. Following an offensive by the Rapid Support Forces on the city of Bara in North Kordofan, they recaptured the city on 25 October 2025.

12. As hostilities shifted from central Sudan to the west and the south, heavy fighting continued in El Fasher, resulting in the Rapid Support Forces capturing the city on 27 October 2025 after an 18-month siege. Following reports of large-scale atrocities in and around El Fasher, the Human Rights Council convened its thirty-eighth special session on 14 November 2025 and adopted resolution S-38/1, requesting the fact-finding mission for the Sudan to conduct an urgent inquiry, to identify perpetrators and to support accountability efforts.

13. The proliferation of advanced military equipment, in particular unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), has empowered parties to the conflict and enhanced their military capabilities, prolonging the hostilities and deepening the crisis.

14. Beyond external military support and arms trade and supplies, parties to the conflict increasingly rely on revenues generated within the Sudan itself, through extraction, exportation, taxation and, at times, looting of resources.³ Gold, livestock and agri-food commodities such as gum arabic have become part of the country's conflict economy, linking human rights violations and abuses with economic interests of internal and external actors and raising serious business and human rights concerns for States and companies sourcing from the Sudan, including due to the risk that such sourcing may contribute to sustaining the conflict.

15. On 19 May 2025, the President of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant-General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan appointed Kamil Idris as Prime Minister for the "Government of Hope".

16. On 26 July 2025, the Sudan Founding Alliance (Ta'sis) declared a governance structure in Rapid Support Forces-controlled areas, led by Lieutenant-General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo as "president" and Abdelaziz Al-Hilu as "vice-president".

³ See the supplementary information to the report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan (A/HRC/60/22), available at <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/ffm-sudan/60-22-supplementary-information-1.pdf>; and S/2024/65 – the final report on the work of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan.

III. Legal framework

A. International legal framework

17. The applicable international legal framework, including international humanitarian, human rights and criminal law, remained unchanged since the previous report of March 2024.⁴

B. National legal framework

18. Aspects of the national legal framework have changed since the previous report of March 2024.⁵

19. On 23 February 2025, the Ministry of Justice issued a revised Constitutional Document reflecting amendments, including a 39-month extension of the transitional period, increased military representation in the Transitional Sovereignty Council, the removal of all references to the Rapid Support Forces, and dissolution of the investigative committee on the violations by security forces related to the 3 June 2019 Khartoum protest.

C. State of emergency

20. As of 15 November 2025, at least 217 emergency orders and security measures continued to be in force across the Sudan since the conflict erupted in April 2023, including for regulating curfews, as well as restrictions on movement and restrictions to freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of peaceful assembly.⁶

21. During a meeting with the Expert in Port Sudan in July 2025, the Minister of Justice committed to reactivate the committee established in February 2023 to review emergency legislation.

IV. Impact of hostilities on civilians

A. Airstrikes and shelling

22. Parties to the conflict employed explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas, deploying artillery shelling and aerial strikes, including using barrel bombs and loitering munitions. They frequently struck densely populated residential areas, often without prior warning. The use of such weaponry in this manner clearly runs counter to the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, under international humanitarian law, and in many cases resulted in multiple civilian casualties.

23. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented the killing of at least 3,700 civilians during the conduct of hostilities, including 1,977 in the Darfur region (of which 1,825 took place in North Darfur) and 932 in the Kordofan region.

24. In addition to the attack on a market in Tora,⁷ a series of Sudanese Armed Forces airstrikes in July 2025, involving barrel bombs, struck residential neighbourhoods and civilian objects in West Kordofan, accounting for at least 80 civilian casualties. This included a strike on the town of El-Dabkar, which killed at least 45 civilians, including six women and three children. On 2 May 2025, Rapid Support Forces-allied militias launched artillery

⁴ A/HRC/55/29, paras. 9–14.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ A/HRC/58/29, para. 24.

⁷ See <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/sudan/ohchr-report-human-rights-situation-in-sudan-1-january-30-juin-2025.pdf>, para. 20.

attacks in the Khamas area, West Kordofan, killing 59 civilians, including one woman. They were reportedly targeting a small number of *mustanfreeen*.⁸

25. Persistent shelling and drone attacks by the Rapid Support Forces in El Fasher caused significant civilian casualties, including at least 527 deaths during the April 2025 offensive on Zamzam camp.

26. On 25 October 2025, Sudanese Armed Forces airstrikes and shelling in Bara, North Kordofan, killed 21 civilians, including nine women. In addition, on 4 November 2025, aerial bombardment by the Sudanese Armed Forces in Abu Zabad, West Kordofan, killed 12 civilians. In North Kordofan, on 3 November 2025, a Rapid Support Forces drone strike in Al-Lwaib killed more than 42 civilians and injured more than 51.

B. Attacks against civilians and other protected persons

27. During the reporting period, there were continued attacks against civilians, including humanitarian and health workers, who were often deliberate targets, despite benefiting from specific protections under international humanitarian law. OHCHR documented the killing of at least 48 humanitarian and health personnel. On 27 October 2025, at least two local humanitarian responders were killed inside El Fasher during house-to-house searches by the Rapid Support Forces.

28. The Saudi Hospital was repeatedly targeted throughout the siege of El Fasher by the Rapid Support Forces, with attacks continuing into 2025, which included the deadly drone strike on 24 January 2025 that killed 67 individuals, including civilians and persons hors de combat, and injured at least 19 others, and the recurring attacks on 5 and 7 October 2025 that reportedly killed 14 civilians, including one women and several children, and injured more than 20 others. These attacks had a devastating impact on the functioning of the hospital.

29. On 21 June 2025, a Sudanese Armed Forces airstrike on a hospital in Al Muglad, West Kordofan, killed 41 civilians, including medical personnel and children; while on 30 August 2025, a Sudanese Armed Forces drone struck the Yashfeen medical facility in Nyala, South Darfur, killing 30 individuals, including civilians and persons hors de combat.

30. On 2 June 2025, a drone strike on a humanitarian convoy in Al-Koma, North Darfur, killed five drivers and destroyed food aid. Parties to the conflict exchanged charges of responsibility.

C. Attacks on civilian and specifically protected objects

31. The parties to the conflict continued to attack civilian objects, including indispensable civilian infrastructure, in contravention of international humanitarian law.

32. Markets were frequent targets; for example, on 13 January 2025, an alleged Sudanese Armed Forces drone struck a market in Ombada Dar es Salam Square, Omdurman, reportedly killing 120 civilians and injuring 150. In two separate incidents on 23 and 28 September 2025, Rapid Support Forces drone strikes hit a market in the Abu Shouk area, El Fasher, killing at least 22 civilians and injuring over 20.

33. OHCHR documented 33 attacks against schools and educational personnel, including those sheltering displaced persons. On 9 June and 10 July 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces conducted aerial strikes, using barrel bombs and drones, hitting three schools in Abu Zabad, West Kordofan, killing 16 civilians and injuring 15. In addition, military use of schools was reported. Based on information received, in October 2025 the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade, allied with the Sudanese Armed Forces, used schools for military training and weapons storage in Al-Tartar administrative unit, South Kordofan. Furthermore, the Sudanese Armed Forces have occupied the Kosti Ahlia and Kosti Vocational high schools in White Nile since April 2023. In two separate incidents on 30 September 2025, artillery shells fired by the Rapid Support Forces struck a community kitchen operating out of Abu Talib School in the

⁸ Civilians mobilized to fight alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Abu Shouk neighbourhood and a school sheltering civilians in the Abu Shouk camp in El Fasher, killing at least 29 people, including women, children and volunteers, and injuring more than 17 others.

34. Healthcare facilities were targeted consistently. During the reporting period, the World Health Organization documented 71 attacks on healthcare.⁹ In two separate incidents in Khartoum on 25 January 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces struck the Al-Hudhud health centre in Jebel Awlia, while Rapid Support Forces artillery shelling of Al Nau Hospital in the Karari area killed six civilians and injured 36 others, including one health worker. In North Kordofan, on 5 October 2025, Rapid Support Forces drone strikes targeting areas in El-Obeid caused damage to the El-Obeid Teaching Hospital and the Social Security Hospital.

35. Religious facilities, including churches and mosques, were also attacked. On 2 December 2024, a Sudanese Armed Forces airstrike hit the Sheikh Muhajir Mosque in Um Rawaba, North Kordofan, killing six civilians. In a deadly incident on 19 September 2025, a Rapid Support Forces drone struck Al-Safa Mosque in El Fasher, killing at least 67 civilians, including two children.

36. OHCHR documented at least 19 attacks on humanitarian operations, with attacks against humanitarian aid convoys continuing. On 20 August 2025, a drone struck a humanitarian convoy carrying food aid in the locality of Mellit, North Darfur.

37. Drone attacks on civilian infrastructure increased. In February 2025, Rapid Support Forces drone strikes on electrical infrastructure in Kosti, White Nile, which crippled water treatment systems, were linked to a cholera outbreak, as residents were forced to consume water from untreated sources. In May 2025, a surge in long-range drone attacks by the Rapid Support Forces targeted civilian infrastructure in numerous states, particularly Port Sudan in Red Sea State. On 21 October 2025, their drone strike on electrical infrastructure in Damazine, Blue Nile, resulted in power outages.

38. Intentionally directing attacks against civilians, including humanitarian personnel, or against civilian and other protected objects, constitutes a war crime.¹⁰

D. Recruitment and use of children

39. The recruitment and use of children continued. OHCHR documented reports of forced recruitment and mobilization of children, and exploitation of children, by both parties, particularly in the Darfur and Kordofan regions, often under highly coercive conditions.

40. OHCHR received reports of a concerning number of forced recruitments of civilians, including children, across West Darfur by the Rapid Support Forces. Sources reported in March 2025 that over 300 children, most under the age of 16, were undergoing military training in El Geneina.

41. The targeting of specific tribes for forced recruitment was documented. Between 1 and 3 January 2025, the Rapid Support Forces targeted Gimir-inhabited villages in the locality of Kulbus, West Darfur. Youth and children were reportedly forcibly recruited. Communities that resisted faced physical violence, including against women. Similar coercion was reported in El Daein, East Darfur, where Arab community leaders were threatened with detention if they failed to provide fighters or financial support.

42. In May 2025, OHCHR received reports of forced recruitment and mobilization of children by the Sudanese Armed Forces in Kadugli, South Kordofan, including testimonies by detained children indicating they had been forcibly recruited under threats to their families. In North Kordofan, OHCHR received, in August 2025, reports of large-scale civilian mobilization, including the forced conscription and recruitment of adults and children, and of distribution of weapons by the Sudanese Armed Forces Military Intelligence, the General Intelligence Service and the Sudan Shield Forces.

⁹ See <https://extranet.who.int/ssa/Index.aspx>.

¹⁰ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8 (2) (e) (i), (iii) and (iv).

43. On 19 August 2025, the announcement by the Minister of Education¹¹ that students fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces, as well as children of fallen fighters, would be exempted from school fees raised concerns over support for the involvement of children in armed conflict.

V. Rights to life, liberty and security of person

A. Summary executions

44. Persistent patterns of deliberate arbitrary deprivation of life, particularly during territorial shifts and reprisal attacks, continued during the reporting period. OHCHR documented the unlawful killing of at least 1,659 civilians outside the scope of direct hostilities, including 460 in the Darfur region (of which 383 were in North Darfur), 332 in Khartoum State and 321 in the Kordofan region. These consisted largely of summary executions of civilians accused of collaboration with the opposing party.

45. Such killings occurred frequently when one party seized control of areas previously held by the other party. In January 2025, OHCHR documented 210 unlawful killings as parties vied for control of Al-Gazira. On or around 11 January, at least 100 civilians were summarily executed by the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied militias in Wad Madani.

46. Unlawful killings surged in March (150) and April (334), primarily due to summary executions in Khartoum following territorial gains by the Sudanese Armed Forces. These reprisals were targeted at civilians who had allegedly collaborated with the Rapid Support Forces, disproportionately affecting individuals from ethnic communities from the Darfur and Kordofan regions. On 13 and 14 April 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigade executed 36 civilians in Alouba and Umm Arada villages, North Kordofan, who had been accused of collaborating with the Rapid Support Forces.

47. The Rapid Support Forces were responsible for a significant number of summary executions during the offensive in mid-April 2025 targeting El Fasher and surrounding areas. According to eyewitnesses, many civilians were shot dead while fleeing, including 10 unarmed men fleeing toward Saloma on 13 April.

48. In Kordofan, both parties, along with allied militias, were implicated in summary killings, including during attacks on villages perceived as being supportive of the opposing party. In May 2025, OHCHR documented the beheading of 17 civilians and three Rapid Support Forces fighters in North Kordofan by the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied militias, after the recapture of the Umm Sumeima administrative unit on 10 May. On 22 and 23 July, the Rapid Support Forces raided a village near El Nehud, West Kordofan, killing at least 32 civilians.

49. In North Darfur, OHCHR monitored a pattern of summary executions by the Rapid Support Forces targeting civilians in and around El Fasher, including those attempting to bring food into the city. This included the execution of two women on 22 July 2025 and five men in late October while bringing in food – a practice reportedly deemed punishable by death.

50. August 2025 saw multiple summary executions by the Rapid Support Forces across North Darfur. On 2 August, 14 civilians were executed in the village of Garni. Between 16 and 18 August, at least 16 civilians were summarily executed: 14 civilians including one woman during an incursion into the Abu Shouk camp; one boy while fleeing to Tawila; and one civilian in El Fasher. On 26 August, they summarily executed 13 civilians, including two women and five children, near Khazan Golo, while attempting to flee El Fasher.

51. In the context of changing control of the city of Bara, North Kordofan, reports indicated a pattern of retaliatory violence against civilians by both parties. This included the summary executions of eight civilians by the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied militias after capturing the city on 11 September 2025. Subsequently, reports emerged of summary

¹¹ See <https://mashaweer-news.com/?p=23574&noamp=mobile>.

executions by the Rapid Support Forces after recapturing the city in late October 2025, including the killing of more than 23 civilians on 26 October.

52. Throughout October 2025, hostilities intensified in El Fasher, marked by large-scale, ethnically motivated attacks, in particular against the Zaghawa, by the Rapid Support Forces. On 6 October, during an attack on the Abu Shouk neighbourhood, at least 12 civilians, including three women, were executed. OHCHR documented the summary killings of at least 13 civilians on 26 and 27 October, after they gained control of El Fasher. Civilians were targeted while fleeing along exit routes, with several civilians killed or injured, and bodies observed along the routes.

53. OHCHR verified the summary killing of dozens of people on 28 October 2025 by the Rapid Support Forces in the El Fasher University medical laboratory, which was being used as a temporary health facility, including for wounded fighters.

B. Sexual violence

54. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented 337 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence involving rape, gang rape, attempted rape, sexual slavery and torture, and other forms of sexual violence, affecting at least 452 victims (244 women, 200 girls, three men and five boys). Of the 337 incidents, 147 had occurred during the reporting period, affecting 230 victims (140 women, 86 girls, one man and three boys). This brings the total number of documented incidents since the onset of the conflict to 464, affecting 663 victims.

55. Most of the incidents were documented in North Darfur (154), South Darfur (79), West Darfur (36) and Khartoum (26). The Rapid Support Forces and their allied militias were implicated in the majority of these incidents (231), followed by the armed Arab militias (73), while five incidents were attributed to the Sudanese Armed Forces, three to the Sudanese Armed Forces-allied Joint Forces, and one to the police.

56. A sharp increase in the number of incidents was observed following 10 April 2025, in connection with the offensive by the Rapid Support Forces on areas surrounding El Fasher, particularly Zamzam camp. At least 118 victims (87 women, 28 girls and three boys) were subjected to sexual violence. In Zamzam camp alone, 31 incidents were documented, while 25 occurred en route during the evacuation to Tawila. Among the documented incidents, two women and one girl died as a result of gang rape.

57. In five incidents, victims appeared to be targeted on the basis of perceived affiliation with the Joint Forces, and faced questions such as “Is your father a member of the Sudanese Armed Forces?” and “Where are the Joint Forces?”, or were accused of spying before being assaulted. Survivors, mostly women from African tribes – particularly the Zaghawa – were also subjected to racially derogatory insults, such as *falangayaat* (female black slaves).

58. Abduction and sexual slavery by members of the Rapid Support Forces were also reported in the context of the attack on Zamzam camp. In mid-May 2025, four women fleeing the camp were captured by them, returned to the camp, and gang-raped for three days; one of them died. Twenty-four other women and one boy were reportedly detained at the same place, where “every night, four to six members of the forces would take one female to be raped”. One of them became pregnant. In another example, on 11 April 2025, a woman was abducted with at least ten others from Zamzam camp and taken to South Darfur. She was held for three weeks, during which she was gang-raped and forced to undertake household work. She became pregnant, however she miscarried following her escape. On 12 April 2025, two women were captured as they fled Zamzam camp; one was repeatedly raped for a month before escaping, while the other woman died in captivity, allegedly due to rape.

59. Following the capture of El Fasher by the Rapid Support Forces in late October 2025, OHCHR confirmed incidents of sexual violence within the city and along exit routes, including the gang rape of at least six girls in two incidents.

60. Twenty cases of pregnancy resulting from rape were documented, including among girls. While some victims were able to access legal abortion, others in North and West Darfur

States were unable to. One victim said that her family had rejected the child as “an offspring of the enemy”, reflecting the lasting impact of sexual violence on families and communities.

61. During 2025, OHCHR received reports of medical personnel and humanitarian volunteers being subjected to sexual violence, including rape and gang rape, in areas controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces.

62. Among the incidents documented during the reporting period, 13 incidents were reported to the Sudan Police Force, including rape cases attributed to its personnel and to personnel of the Sudanese Armed Forces, who were convicted after their immunity was lifted. In a case reported to the Rapid Support Forces, the perpetrator was briefly detained, while the victim’s family was reportedly detained for seeking justice.

C. Detention

63. The reporting period saw a sharp increase in arbitrary arrest and detention, with OHCHR documenting the detention of 825 individuals.

64. Arbitrary detentions by parties to the conflict took place notably following the capture of contested territory. Detainees were subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and held in inhumane conditions characterized by extreme overcrowding, poor ventilation, lack of food and water, and insufficient sanitation, leading to a significant number of deaths in custody.¹²

65. The most pronounced trend was the large-scale detention of civilians by the party taking control of an area, targeting alleged collaborators or supporters of the opposing force. Between December 2024 and February 2025, the Rapid Support Forces detained 18 civilians in Meiram, Muglad and Teboun, in West Kordofan, accusing them of collaborating with the Sudanese Armed Forces. Similarly, on 2 April 2025, a civilian was detained by Military Intelligence and the General Intelligence Service in El Nuhud, West Kordofan, for allegedly supporting the Rapid Support Forces. The detainee reported that approximately 85 others were detained under emergency law.

66. The Sudanese Armed Forces and allied militias conducted arrest campaigns after recapturing Wad Madani in Al-Gazira State. Between January and June 2025, OHCHR received reports that approximately 4,000 individuals were detained, accused of collaborating with the Rapid Support Forces. Many were held without official charges or legal representation. Detainees were held in poor and overcrowded conditions that contributed to a cholera outbreak, allegedly resulting in the deaths of more than 300 detainees. Lack of adequate food and water and absence of medical care were also reported.

67. Civilians from Darfur and Kordofan were systematically profiled and detained on the basis of perceived affiliation with the opposing forces. Both parties equated certain ethnicities with support for the opposing party. On 10 July 2025, a joint operation involving the Sudan Police Force, the Sudanese Armed Forces and intelligence services targeted Dar es Salam and Bentiu in Khartoum – predominantly inhabited by persons from Darfur and South Kordofan – leading to the arrest of 28 individuals accused of collaborating with the Rapid Support Forces, and of 42 foreign nationals for allegedly violating residency laws. In May and June 2025, the Rapid Support Forces detained eight men from the Hamar tribe for alleged affiliation with the Sudanese Armed Forces in El Nuhud, West Kordofan; while most were released, one died in custody.

68. In October and November 2025, OHCHR monitored the detention of thousands of civilians after the capture of El Fasher by the Rapid Support Forces and identified at least four detention sites in the city, including a hospital.

¹² OHCHR report, “Detention facilities and practices in Khartoum”, March 2025, available at <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/sudan/report-ohchr-sudan-country-office-detention-facilities-khartoum.pdf>.

69. The Rapid Support Forces systematically used abduction as a revenue-generating mechanism, holding civilians for ransom. They reportedly abducted more than 200 individuals in January 2025 alone, and held them for ransom, with demands ranging from 4 to 50 million Sudanese pounds (approximately from \$1,600 to \$20,000).

70. Torture and other forms of ill-treatment have been systematic practices, resulting in death in some cases. In February 2025, a former football player died in custody in Al-Gazira after being tortured by Sudanese Armed Forces-allied security forces and militias for allegedly collaborating with the Rapid Support Forces. In August 2025, OHCHR received information regarding the death of a civilian from El Nuhud, West Kordofan, tortured by the Rapid Support Forces on accusation of being affiliated with *mustanfreeen*.

D. Disappearances and missing persons

71. The reporting period was marked by a pattern of disappearances and missing persons by both parties and their allied security forces and militias, raising concerns over potential cases of enforced disappearance. Throughout the reporting period, OHCHR recorded 336 individuals who had been reported missing, with disappearances persisting in complete disregard of international human rights law.

72. On 26 May 2025, a man died after four months of incommunicado detention in Rapid Support Forces custody in Khartoum.

73. The situation of missing persons remained of grave concern. The Khartoum State Forensic Medicine Authority reported, on 6 July 2025, on the burial of 3,800 unidentified bodies recovered from streets and homes.

VI. Civic space

74. Civic space continued to shrink due to persistent human rights violations, with fundamental rights, including the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, unduly restricted.

75. In the context of emergency orders and security-related measures imposed by both parties, widespread arbitrary detention persisted, often targeted at individuals on unfounded allegations of affiliation with the opposing party.

76. Parties to the conflict continued to suppress dissent through arbitrary detention, including targeting those expressing anti-war views or criticizing the conflict, often triggered by phone inspections revealing content interpreted as indicative of “collaboration” with the opposing side. In May 2025, at least seven human rights defenders and three teachers were arrested by security forces in Kordofan for criticizing the situation and the practices of the Sudanese Armed Forces. While five were released after signing pledges not to publish content related to these issues, the teachers faced serious charges, including “waging war against the State” and “undermining the constitutional system”. In August 2025, a humanitarian volunteer was detained in East Darfur by the Rapid Support Forces for criticizing them. These practices compelled civil society actors to engage in self-censorship, fearing reprisals.

77. Threats and harassment, including instances of hate speech, further intensified the chilling effect on civic space. Such rhetoric, which may amount to incitement to discrimination or violence, breaches international human rights norms and standards.¹³ In North Kordofan, there were increasing calls on social media, reportedly by the Sudanese Armed Forces-allied militias, to kill anti-war activists. In Northern, Al-Gazira and River Nile States and in eastern Sudan, lawyers faced threats for representing individuals accused of collaboration with the Rapid Support Forces, or belonging to ethnic communities of western Sudan.

¹³ For example, article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

78. According to the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate, 11 male journalists and media workers had been killed, including during the conduct of hostilities; 16 journalists and media workers had been arbitrarily detained, including three women, and six had disappeared, including one woman. Between April and June 2025, at least two journalists were detained and interrogated in eastern Sudan by the Joint Security Cell and Military Intelligence for denouncing corruption, and were released within a month. Following the May 2025 drone attacks in Port Sudan, international and regional media were banned by the Ministry of Culture and Information from reporting outside of their offices for three months, while international media correspondents were required to renew their work permits every month.

79. Telecommunication disruptions and Internet restrictions further limited access to information. In February 2025, the Rapid Support Forces confiscated 52 Starlink devices, while the Sudanese Armed Forces confiscated 12 other Starlink devices in Kordofan. These constraints, combined with widespread disinformation and a lack of timely and accessible public-interest information, hindered access to critical information.

80. The rights to freedom of association and freedom of peaceful assembly were unduly restricted. In May 2025, the General Registrar of Labour Organizations issued a directive to dissolve all executive offices of labour organizations and convert them into preparatory committees, ending the electoral cycle of all executive offices of labour organizations and converting them to steering committees, a move seen by independent labour organizations as violating the International Labour Organization (ILO) Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), to which the Sudan is a party.

81. Peaceful gathering was also restricted. In July 2025, 18 protesters were detained by Military Intelligence and the General Intelligence Service, while protesting against the humanitarian situation and about other social issues in Kordofan.

VII. Economic and social rights

82. In the context of the conflict, resources were disproportionately diverted towards military expenditure, leaving insufficient funding for essential services such as healthcare, food and education.¹⁴

83. The conflict triggered an unprecedented food crisis, gravely affecting people's enjoyment of the core content of the right to food. In December 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) estimated that 24.6 million people were at crisis level or worse (IPC phase 3+), including 637,000 people at catastrophe level (IPC phase 5), with famine conditions confirmed in the Zamzam, Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps of North Darfur and in the western Nuba mountains. In November 2025, the Famine Review Committee reported that famine conditions (IPC Phase 5 – with reasonable evidence) were occurring in El Fasher and Kadugli – towns largely cut off from commercial supplies and assistance.¹⁵

84. The deteriorating economic situation, significantly exacerbated by the conflict, including persistently high inflation and recurrent food price spikes, has continued to undermine food availability and accessibility.¹⁶ Attacks on markets, food supplies and

¹⁴ While no official budget tables for 2025 were made public, a media statement by the Minister of Finance on 22 January 2025 indicated that the budget would include significant spending, alongside stated priorities for humanitarian response and basic services. However, reports indicate that the allocations were actually directed towards military and security expenditure. See <https://3ayin.com/en/budget-/>.

¹⁵ See <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/countries-in-focus-archive/issue-117/en/>, https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Alert_Sudan_July2025.pdf and <https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/famine-conditions-confirmed-in-sudan-fasher-and-kadugli-as-hunger-and-malnutrition-ease-where-conflict-subsides/en>.

¹⁶ While the inflation rate of the Sudan declined from earlier peaks, it remains high. As at November 2025, annual inflation was estimated at approximately 77 per cent, with food prices continuing to grow. The World Food Programme reported a 15 per cent annual increase in the national food basket and an up to 140 per cent year-on-year rise in the prices of key staples; see <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/wfp-sudan-market-monitor-november-2025>.

humanitarian aid have deepened the crisis. Siege conditions in El Fasher and Kadugli deprived civilians of essential supplies, while the obstruction of trade routes in Kordofan and Abyei drove up prices, further impacting the availability and accessibility of food.

85. The conflict continued to undermine the right to safe drinking water. Over 17.3 million people¹⁷ lack access to safe drinking water due to service disruptions, infrastructure attacks and power outages. Rapid Support Forces drone strikes on civilian infrastructure in several states disrupted water treatment and electricity supplies, forcing people to rely on unsafe water sources and contributing to outbreaks of waterborne diseases. In Khartoum, more than 2,700 cholera infections and 172 deaths were reported in one week during May 2025 following a strike on a water treatment plant. In Kassala and other agricultural areas, power cuts in May crippled irrigation systems, causing crop dehydration and harvest and income losses.

86. The conflict gravely affected the right to health, amid collapsing infrastructure and recurrent disease outbreaks. Over 3,400 deaths and nearly 122,000 suspected cases of cholera were reported since July 2024.¹⁸ While infection rates rose sharply, only 16 per cent of primary care facilities and 14 per cent of hospitals remained operational.¹⁹ Attacks on health facilities and workers are of serious concern, with 71 attacks on healthcare, leading to 1,541 deaths and 294 injuries.²⁰ Rapid Support Forces drone attacks in Red Sea and other states disrupted electricity and water supplies, forcing hospitals to suspend services, including dialysis centres in Port Sudan that reduced operations to two hours per day. In El Fasher, testimonies indicated reliance on expired drugs and severe shortages of staff and equipment.

87. The conflict continued to devastate the education sector, with about 13 million children out of school as at September 2025, many of whom had lost more than two years of education since the conflict erupted, making the Sudan the location for one of the world's worst education crises.²¹ In Rapid Support Forces-controlled areas of Darfur and Kordofan, children faced a complete absence of formal education and increasing risks of exploitation and recruitment. This crisis threatened the future of an entire generation and undermined long-term development prospects.

88. In December 2024, the Ministry of Education administered secondary school certificate examinations only in Sudanese Armed Forces-controlled areas and at international centres, excluding students in Rapid Support Forces-controlled regions. This denied a significant number of students the right to education, in violation of the Sudanese authorities' obligations to ensure equitable access to education for all students within their jurisdiction, irrespective of territorial control. The Rapid Support Forces were reported as obstructing students travelling to Sudanese Armed Forces-controlled areas for examinations.

VIII. Humanitarian situation

89. The conflict in the Sudan has continued to fuel the world's largest displacement crisis, with an estimated 7.2 million people internally displaced and approximately 4.3 million people fleeing into neighbouring countries since the beginning of the conflict.²² Humanitarian access remained restricted due to deliberate obstruction of aid, compounded by violence, bureaucratic hurdles and attacks on aid workers by parties to the conflict. A positive step by the authorities was the extension of the opening of the Adre crossing until 31 December 2025.

¹⁷ See <https://www.unicef.org/sudan/water-sanitation-and-hygiene>.

¹⁸ See <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-occupied-palestinian-territory-sudan-mozambique-ukraine>.

¹⁹ See [https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/public-health-situation-analysis--sudan-conflict-\(10-march-2025\)](https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/public-health-situation-analysis--sudan-conflict-(10-march-2025)).

²⁰ See <https://extranet.who.int/ssa/Index.aspx>.

²¹ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/more-three-quarters-sudans-children-out-school-new-academic-year-begins>.

²² See <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-mobility-update-22>.

90. From December 2024, significant return movements were recorded, particularly following the recapture of Sennar, Al-Gazira and Khartoum by the Sudanese Armed Forces. As of September 2025, over 2.6 million individuals, mostly women and girls, returned to their area of origin.²³ Returns were driven by dire living conditions and inadequate humanitarian support in areas of displacement and asylum. Over one third of women reported worsening security upon return, with rising gender-based violence, forced marriage and harassment.²⁴

91. Displaced persons reportedly feared protection risks upon return, including insecurity, explosive hazards and lack of basic services. In return areas, housing, land and property rights remained a serious concern, with property destruction, lack of access to land and housing, lack of income-generating opportunities and land-grabbing undermining efforts to achieve durable solutions. Women were disproportionately affected, with nearly half of women lacking secure access to land or housing.²⁵

92. Internally displaced persons faced forced evictions or the threat of eviction by authorities, as seen in eastern Sudan, raising concerns about forced returns, in violation of the principles of voluntariness, dignity and safety.

93. The rights of persons with disabilities were severely affected during displacement. Persons with disabilities were forced to flee with no support, subjected to stigma-driven harassment. Furthermore, they encountered barriers to accessing basic services, including food, healthcare and shelter, and participating in decision-making on humanitarian responses.²⁶ The conflict also led to a rise in acquired or additional impairments, particularly among those fleeing El Fasher. From 26 October to 1 December 2025, an estimated 701 separated children and 244 unaccompanied children were registered by the Child Protection Area of Responsibility across the localities of Tawila, Korma, Kutum, Al Tina, Sortoni and Kabkabiya.²⁷

IX. Administration of justice and accountability

94. The administration of justice in areas controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces was systematically targeted at individuals accused of affiliation or collaboration with the Rapid Support Forces. OHCHR monitoring indicated a pattern of harsh judicial sentencing, including the death penalty or life imprisonment, accompanied by ethnic and geographic profiling. Trials often lacked transparency, used coerced evidence, and involved intimidation of defence lawyers, violating international standards for fair trial and due process.

95. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented 321 sentences of capital punishment and 228 sentences of life imprisonment or long prison terms, imposed by criminal and anti-terrorism courts. The death sentences were issued in numerous states, demonstrating a nationwide pattern, including Al-Gazira (129), Khartoum (97) and River Nile (38).

96. OHCHR documented violations of fair trial and due process guarantees against women and children, for alleged association with the Rapid Support Forces. At least eight women were sentenced to death, three to life imprisonment and four to long-term sentences, while five minors were sentenced to social supervision measures or imprisonment. On 11 August 2025, a woman was sentenced to death on the basis of her photos where she was wearing the “Kadamol” (the scarf used by the Rapid Support Forces), as the primary evidence for convicting her of collaboration. Another case involved a female lawyer, detained with her infant, being sentenced in April 2025 to seven years of imprisonment for resharing a speech

²³ See <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-return-monitoring-snapshot-08>.

²⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/giha-gender-snapshot-returnee-women-and-girls-september-2025>.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ See <https://voiceeu.org/publications/inclusive-humanitarian-action-policy-brief-april-2025.pdf>.

²⁷ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/unicef-sudan-consolidated-humanitarian-flash-update-north-darfur-and-kordofan-crisis-26-october-01-december-2025>.

by Abu Aqla Keikel²⁸ on her social media account. Although overturned on appeal, her case was being retried by the same court of first instance, in which hearings have been constantly postponed.

97. During March 2025, Wad Madani Criminal Court reportedly initiated proceedings against 950 individuals accused of collaborating with the Rapid Support Forces. The lack of public access and transparency raised concerns about the potential for mass convictions, potentially resulting in collective punishment.

98. Individuals from Darfur and Kordofan were disproportionately targeted for alleged affiliation with the Rapid Support Forces, which may constitute discrimination, including on ethnic origin grounds. In December 2024, a student from West Kordofan was arrested, reportedly on the basis of his ethnic background, by Military Intelligence in Northern State for allegedly supporting the Rapid Support Forces, and was sentenced to five years of imprisonment.

99. With regard to accountability efforts, on 25 August 2025, El-Obeid Criminal Court sentenced two Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers to life imprisonment for raping a woman.

100. The National Committee for Investigating Crimes and Violations of National Law and International Humanitarian Law reported that as of July 2025, over 124,000 such cases had been recorded. Of these, only 400 cases involving regular forces had been recorded by the Committee, while the majority concerned the Rapid Support Forces.

101. In Rapid Support Forces-controlled areas, no formal justice system was operational. OHCHR observed the establishment of emergency courts directly linked to security forces. In August 2025, an emergency court, established in West Kordofan, was composed of “the public prosecutor”, the legal adviser of the Rapid Support Forces and the director of the Military Police, undermining the principles of judicial independence and impartiality.

X. Conclusion and recommendations

102. **After nearly three years of relentless conflict, the Sudan stands at a critical juncture. The cumulative impact on civilians has been catastrophic, with widespread loss of life, mass displacement, and the collapse of essential services.**

103. **The conflict has been marked by gross violations and abuses of international human rights law as well as serious violations of international humanitarian law, committed with generalized impunity. The persistent lack of accountability has been a key factor in igniting and sustaining the conflict in the Sudan. Bringing to justice all perpetrators – regardless of their rank or affiliation – is essential to breaking the entrenched cycles of violence and impunity.**

104. **Parties to the conflict failed to uphold their expressed commitments to protect civilians and facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid. The deliberate obstruction of humanitarian aid, the use of siege tactics and the targeting of civilian infrastructure have deepened the suffering of millions and undermined prospects for recovery.**

105. **The fragmentation of territorial control, amid the rise in ethnically motivated violence, signals a dangerous trajectory. There are serious concerns not only regarding the unity of the Sudan but also regarding the stability of the broader region, as cross-border displacement and regional tensions escalate.**

106. **The High Commissioner calls upon the parties to the conflict:**

(a) **To cooperate and engage in inclusive peace negotiations and mediation efforts in good faith and reach an immediate cessation of hostilities;**

(b) **To fully comply with their obligations and responsibilities under international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and take specific**

²⁸ Commander of the Sudan Shield Forces, allied with the Sudanese Armed Forces.

measures for the protection of civilians, including through issuing and enforcing strict command orders to end sexual violence in conflict;

(c) To investigate, prevent and punish violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of international human rights law;

(d) To end all practices of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, to release all persons arbitrarily detained, and to halt all attacks on, threats against and harassment of civil society representatives and members of the media;

(e) To cease attacks on civilian objects and infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, water supply systems and electricity grids supplying civilian life;

(f) To ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief at scale and the safe and unimpeded access of humanitarian organizations, to all areas under their control, and to ensure safe passage for civilians fleeing conflict zones;

(g) To cooperate in good faith with his Office, his Expert, and the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan.

107. The High Commissioner urges the Sudanese authorities:

(a) To prioritize the resumption of basic services and the protection of civilians, particularly in conflict-affected and displacement-prone areas;

(b) To pursue investigations and ensure accountability for violations of international law, in line with international human rights standards, as a matter of priority;

(c) To respect the rights to due process and fair trial, and refrain from the use of the death penalty;

(d) To ensure the unimpeded access of victims of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, to medical services, including sexual and reproductive health, psychosocial and legal services;

(e) To facilitate the unhindered work of humanitarian organizations, including access, safety, and coordination mechanisms, for effective response;

(f) To refrain from restricting civic space and the work of civil society representatives, of human rights defenders, including women human rights defenders, of journalists and of lawyers, including on the basis of states of emergency and emergency orders;

(g) To ensure that the declarations and implementation of states of emergency comply with international human rights law.

108. The High Commissioner recommends that the international community:

(a) Intensify engagement in and support of coordinated efforts to reach a cessation of hostilities, and collectively insist on a unified road map for the resolution of the conflict, ensuring the centrality of human rights and accountability considerations;

(b) Support a broad-based inclusive dialogue that reflects the diversity of the Sudanese population and paves the way for a transition to a civilian-led Government, putting an emphasis on the specific role of women and young people;

(c) Exert influence to prevent international law violations by all parties to the conflict in the Sudan, and fulfil their obligations under international law to take steps to prevent and punish violations, and not to enable violations;

(d) Support local civil society and other relevant actors, including by providing resources and strengthening their capacities on the protection and promotion of human rights, and by supporting the provision of comprehensive services to survivors of violations;

(e) Increase and sustain consistent support for humanitarian operations both within the Sudan and in neighbouring countries;

- (f) Encourage the Sudanese authorities and neighbouring countries to cooperate with the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan;
- (g) Encourage neighbouring countries to actively support peace and reconciliation efforts in the Sudan;
- (h) Ensure that accountability measures are pursued at different levels, including in international and national forums;
- (i) Exert influence on relevant actors to refrain from providing any support, resources or assistance that could sustain the conflict;
- (j) In the light of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), take stricter measures to implement the arms embargo in Darfur, and consider expanding it to the whole of the Sudan, and refrain from providing any type of military support directly or indirectly to the parties to the conflict;
- (k) Press the Security Council to refer the entire situation in the Sudan to the International Criminal Court.
