Sudan: CAP LC and Human Rights Without Frontiers Submit Joint Stakeholder Report to the UN Universal Periodic Review

Ahead of Sudan’s fourth-cycle Universal Periodic Review, a joint stakeholder submission documents how the gap between pledges and practice has enabled chemical weapons allegations, drone warfare, and human shielding.

by CAP Liberté de Conscience

A joint stakeholder submission has been prepared by Human Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF) and the Coordination des Associations et des Particuliers pour la Liberté de Conscience (CAP LC) for the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Republic of the Sudan at the 54th session of the UPR Working Group, to be held in January-February 2027.
The submission focuses on four interconnected concerns arising from the armed conflict that broke out in April 2023: allegations that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) used chemical weapons and other prohibited means of warfare; violations against civilians in El-Obeid, including restrictions on movement and the alleged use of civilians as human shields; the role of external support networks, including alleged transfers linked to Saudi Arabia and Egypt; and Türkiye’s role in arming the SAF, in particular with drones.

From pledges to atrocities

The report’s central argument is that Sudan’s fourth UPR cycle — explicitly designed as an implementation cycle — has collapsed into what the NGOs describe as deliberate reversal rather than delayed implementation. Sudan accepted third-cycle recommendations to cease excessive force against civilians and to abolish torture. These pledges are directly contradicted, the submission argues, by the aerial bombardment of populated areas using Turkish-supplied Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones — identified by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as the leading cause of civilian death in the Sudan war — and by allegations of weaponised chlorine use near the al-Jaili refinery. The absence of accountability for the 3 June 2019 massacre, which Sudan committed to address, signalled to current commanders that grave violations would attract no consequence, enabling the recurrence of the same patterns at expanded scale.

Chemical weapons and El-Obeïd

On chemical weapons, the submission cites the France 24 investigation, supported by C4ADS, which documented evidence consistent with weaponised chlorine use near the al-Jaili refinery and traced at least part of the chlorine supply chain through an Indian exporter and onward transfers through Saudi-linked routes to Sudan. The report stresses that close links between SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Saudi Arabia’s senior leadership should not be allowed to deter full investigation.

Regarding El-Obeid, the submission reports that civilians have faced severe movement restrictions and practices that may amount to the use of human shields by the SAF, conduct that would violate the obligation to distinguish between civilians and combatants. It also notes that Sudan has registered no meaningful progress on ratification commitments accepted during the third cycle, including CEDAW, the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, and the Rome Statute — the non-ratification of the latter having enabled continued obstruction of ICC investigations.

Türkiye’s drones

The submission expresses particular concern about Türkiye’s continued supply of armed drones, munitions, and technical support to the SAF, despite the long-standing UN arms embargo. Turkish defence company Baykar has reportedly provided Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones, loitering munitions, warheads, command-and-control equipment, and training teams. These systems have been used in urban and densely populated areas such as Khartoum, El Fasher, and parts of Kordofan, contributing to a sharp rise in civilian casualties and attacks on markets, displacement camps, and critical infrastructure. Allegations of covert delivery routes and use of intermediaries, the report notes, raise serious questions about sanctions evasion by a NATO member state.

Recommended actions

The submission recommends, among other measures, that Sudan establish an independent mechanism with OPCW participation to investigate chemical weapons allegations within twelve months; disclose procurement records for arms and dual-use materials transferred since April 2023 within six months; immediately end the use of civilians as human shields in El-Obeid; facilitate independent monitoring of drone strikes with disaggregated reporting by supplier origin; and cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court, including the surrender of indictees. An immediate moratorium on all arms transfers, pending UN Panel of Experts verification, should be implemented by Sudan and all supplier states.

The NGOs further note that the recommendations addressed to Sudan are directed towards a de facto authority — the Sovereign Transitional Council — which has no mandate from the Sudanese people, and that a durable solution will only be achieved through inclusive, civilian-led, internationally supervised negotiations without preconditions for participation.